Don't blame Hodgson, don't blame the players: England's problem is culture of fear and failure

Another England exit, more howls of outrage and anguish, tempered only by the knowledge that in the context of the previous four days, going out of Euro 2016 to a nation of 330,000 probably isn’t that big a deal in the wider scheme of things.

There were, from various sources, the familiar accusations that players on Premier League wages don’t care enough, the usual calls for root-and-branch reform, for winter breaks and - perhaps more pertinently in a post-referendum world - for the diminution of the foreign influence over the England game. In the days to come, there’ll be long and learned pieces about why English football must follow the Dutch model, or build its own Clairefontaine, or do what the Germans did after Euro 2000.

Few of the suggestions are without merit. Most are written well-meaningly. But the post-mortem is as much a part of the tournament tradition as the tournament song and the designation of a psychic animal. English football has been reforming its roots and branches since the defeat by Hungary in 1953.

Greg Dyke, the FA president, launched his England DNA project in December 2014 as “the start point for the creation of a world-class culture of elite player development that leads to winning England teams.” That process is on-going, as it must be. Nobody can imagine roots and branches can be reformed in 18 months. It took Germany 14 years from launching its reforms to win something – and they went from a starting point of being a lot better at winning stuff than England. Only the glibbest of opportunists could imagine that laying another reform process on top of that one could achieve anything other than confusion.

There’s also the Elite Player Performance Plan, which was launched in October 2011 to improve youth development (to dismay from those who felt it privileged Premier League clubs) and which exists in slightly awkward collaboration with England DNA. Fixes aren’t quick and it would be ludicrous to claim England’s defeat by Iceland somehow shows either scheme isn’t working; unless there is good reason to believe either has already been counter-productive, instituting another overhaul would be nothing but a PR exercise.

It’s easy too to blame Roy Hodgson. Managers always provide a useful receptacle for blame and Hodgson at least acknowledged that, resigning as soon as the game was over. It may seem slightly odd that somebody should carry their statement of resignation with them to work – he at least was not guilty of the complacency many have accused England’s players of – but it did mean his end was rapid.

But really what did Hodgson do wrong? There are those who will say he is not an inspiring figure and perhaps they’re right; but that’s something that’s almost impossible for outsiders to judge. There was a marked change in tone from the camp after the draw to Slovakia, a sense that something had soured, and after the Iceland defeat there were self-justificatory claims that players were left bored and confused by Hodgson’s preparations, but it hardly counts as mutiny if players grow frustrated after a manager’s second-last game. This, certainly, was nothing like the insurgency against Fabio Capello in Rustenburg in 2010.

Tactically, Hodgson devised two reasonably similar plans: a 4-3-3 for taking on sides who sat deep and a 4-3-1-2 for playing on the break against more proactive teams. That suggested a clear-sightedness and a willingness to adapt to the opposition that has not always characterised England managers.

He was undermined, though, by the loss of Danny Welbeck, a player perfectly suited to that role of cutting in from the left in a 4-3-3, and by the shrivelling of poor Raheem Sterling, a 21-year-old who has gone in two years from pulsing hope of English football to timorous scapegoat, and who desperately needs a release of pressure to recover form and confidence. When Adam Lallana was also injured before the Iceland game, England were left to bodge a front three comprised entirely of central strikers.

The substitutions against Russia were oddly negative and invited needless pressure towards the end of a game England had dominated; and the constant reliance on Jack Wilshere, who palpably wasn’t fully fit, was strange. But neither are hanging offences. Most controversial was the team selection against Slovakia, when Hodgson made six changes from the side that had beaten Wales. In retrospect it was a gamble that failed, but the gamble itself was understandable.

Harry Kane and Raheem Sterling had not played well: swapping in Daniel Sturridge and Jamie Vardy made sense on the grounds of form. Rotating out the full-backs to ensure they weren’t exhausted for later in the tournament was bold and far-sighted, a replication of Mauricio Pochettino’s policy at Tottenham all season. Similarly, Hodgson knew he couldn’t take on a top side with Wayne Rooney and Dele Alli in midfield, so he gave minutes to his more defensive midfielders. All that was perfectly logical and, had England converted any of the 29 shots they had in that game, Hodgson would have been praised for his far-sightedness, for looking at winning the tournament rather than merely the next game.

But they didn’t. And so England were left to fail in the familiar way, humping endless aimless balls into the box, lacking incision or decisive thinking – just as they had been against Croatia in 2007, against Brazil in 2002, against Norway in 1993 and in countless other embarrassments. Is it the pressure that does that, the sense of the history of failure that weighs down on players and prevents them thinking? Is it in youth coaching? Is it innate? Whatever the reason, it is the problem, and always has been.

After four games, England had had more shots than any other team in the tournament. Admittedly given many of them were speculative punts from 30 yards, that perhaps doesn’t mean a huge amount but it does suggest the level of control England had in all four games – even against Iceland, despite the mental collapse after half-time.

Weirdly, frustrating as the attacking inadequacies were, what undid them were two goalkeeping errors and two hapless efforts to defend basic balls into the box.

Even if only one goal fewer had been conceded, England would probably be in the quarter-finals and reflecting on how they, like Italy, like Spain, like France, had found dogged smaller sides hard to break down, and looking forward to testing out Hodgson’s belief that England, with pace in attacking areas, were better suited to breaking down teams who came out and attacked them. His biggest fault, perhaps, was to allow focus to drift too much to that and away from overcoming the stubborn defences of the early stages.

So yes, Hodgson was culpable, but so too were the players and so too is the culture of English football. As Steven Gerrard pointed out, the second half against Iceland was the performance of a scared side knowing exactly what sort of frenzy of condemnation they’d walk into at home.

Because there are so few games that matter in international football, the consequences of defeat are that much greater. Hodgson has gone but most of the problems remain. Worst of all, it’s far from clear that the constant cycle of root and branch reforms is having any positive impact at all.