Liverpool's 'epic swindle'? Five years on, and Reds still no nearer to greatness

It was, claimed Tom Hicks, an “epic swindle”.

Internet terrorists had waged a campaign against him, he insisted. Three of the Liverpool board – Martin Broughton, Christian Purslow and Ian Ayre – had conspired to sell the club, against the wishes of owners Hicks and George Gillett, to New England Sports Ventures.

That was in 2010. Today marks the fifth anniversary of the day NESV, subsequently known as Fenway Sports Group, agreed to buy Liverpool.

They arrived with the initial popularity afforded to anyone who was not Hicks or Gillett, their hated predecessors, and unlike them, they have not driven Liverpool to the brink of bankruptcy. They guaranteed a more enlightened, more ambitious, less selfish brand of American ownership.

But they arrived with contradictory statements.

“Our style is to under-promise and over-deliver,” said Tom Werner, who was promptly appointed Liverpool chairman. But the principal owner John W Henry stated: "We regard our role as that of stewards for the club with a primary focus on returning the club to greatness on and off the field for the long term. We are committed first and foremost to winning. We have a history of winning.”

Five years on, it is safe to say that greatness has eluded FSG. Liverpool’s days of winning are very much in their history, not in Henry’s time at Anfield. A solitary trophy, and the League Cup at that, and one top-four finish, means the last half-decade ranks as one of Liverpool’s most barren spells since Bill Shankly made them champions in 1964.

Now Jurgen Klopp has been parachuted into the manager’s job in an attempt to avert a fifth mediocre season in six, even if the first was scarcely FSG’s fault: they bought a club in the relegation zone. But lowly league positions – one title tilt excepted – have been allied with underachievement on a stage that brought the club greatness.

Ranked the best team in Europe 18 months before FSG’s takeover, Liverpool now languish in 54th place in UEFA’s increasingly damning coefficients. Their five years have contained a solitary Champions League win, against Ludogorets, and the aim of becoming regulars in the most prestigious club competition remains unrealised.

In one respect, FSG have under-promised and over-delivered. Whereas Hicks had promised “a spade in the ground within 60 days” on a new stadium after their 2007 takeover, Werner’s more cautious rhetoric has proved truthful. It may be a belated and less ambitious plan but the new Main Stand is becoming a feature in the Liverpool skyline. For the first time in its 131-year history, Anfield’s average attendance should soar above 50,000 next season. Their historic home should finally prove more profitable.

But FSG have fared better with bricks and mortar than players and managers. Anfield has hosted experiments with various business models in a manner that feels like a group of CEOs have been brainstorming. Contrasting theories have been put into practice. FSG’s choice of managers has veered between extremes. They were swayed by the sentiment of Kenny Dalglish’s return and his excellent record as caretaker. They dismissed a man in his sixties for one in his thirties, with Brendan Rodgers’ 180-page brochure the antidote to Dalglish’s mystical references to ‘the Liverpool Way’. Klopp, in some ways, is the anti-Rodgers, a bigger personality with a bigger medal collection. Five years after their takeover, his appointment feels the best thing FSG have done.

Certainly their transfer record has scope for improvement. FSG have bought British, particularly in 2011, and foreign. They have authorised the five most expensive signings in Liverpool’s history, but also the three biggest sales. In each case, and most notably in 2014, they have looked for the cumulative benefits of different arrivals to outweigh the loss of one stellar individual. Especially when Luis Suarez left, it did not.

They have brought the word ‘Moneyball’ into the footballing vocabulary. They have not always implemented it – Andy Carroll, Christian Benteke and Adam Lallana are examples of paying over the odds – but constantly there have been attempts to prove cleverer than anyone else in the market.

Many have failed. When Charlie Adam, Stewart Downing and Jordan Henderson arrived in 2011, it was noted how each had been among the most prolific creators of chances the previous season. With all in harness, Liverpool promptly recorded the joint-lowest total of league goals in their history.

More recently, efforts to identify improving young players before their values escalate or exploit the vogue markets have brought Lazar Markovic and Divock Origi to Anfield. The problem may not be the idea, but the identification of players, which has been faulty too often, and an internal structure whereby a manager and transfer committee could seemingly each veto the other’s better ideas while compromising unsuccessfully. Klopp’s suggestion, that he has the first and last word in any discussions, seemed to suggest that, belatedly, common-sense thinking is being introduced.

FSG have recouped about £250 million for players - £174 million of that for Suarez, Fernando Torres and Raheem Sterling alone – but spent some £420 million on 43 arrivals. In part, that is a reflection of football’s inflated economics and, despite the money wasted, football’s increased revenue could mean buying Liverpool still proves a savvy business move. But those sums also reflect the endless annual overhauls at Anfield, the institutionalised instability in the squad and the now-entrenched idea that their fortunes can be transformed with a few signings when their sole successful season, 2013-14, owed precious little to those recruited the previous summer.

Perhaps the lesson, if FSG choose to learn it, is that baseball-style metrics cannot be applied to football. Perhaps they have just lacked the judgement that comes with a lifelong grounding in the game.

Certainly the difference in the sports is evident. Liverpool have the fifth-highest turnover and wage bill in the Premier League. Their average finish under FSG is fifth. Only four clubs have won the league in the last 20 seasons and only six have recorded a top-four finish in the last 11. FSG’s thinking may be different, but they seem powerless to change the status quo. At times, clubs run with smaller budgets but greater clarity of thought threaten to overhaul them.

Baseball provides rather greater opportunities for inventive thinkers. There have been nine winners in 14 MLB seasons and FSG’s Boston Red Sox, with three World Series, rank among its great achievers. In a different environment and culture, FSG’s methods have brought mixed returns, and despite having the sport's fourth-highest wage bill, Boston will miss the end-of-season play-offs for the fifth time in six seasons. When they have worked well, however, they have had spectacular successes.

That has brought the greatness Henry referenced, the over-delivering Werner invoked. Boston’s 86-year wait to win the World Series was concluded in 2004 and "the curse of the Bambino" banished.

Liverpool’s 25 years without a league title is threatening to assume similar proportions. Perhaps this is the curse of Baros, Balotelli, Borini and Biscan.

Regardless, and for all the optimism Klopp’s appointment has generated, FSG’s anniversary may not provoke many celebrations. Henry and Werner’s first game was a Merseyside derby at Goodison Park. Liverpool were comprehensively beaten 2-0 and Roy Hodgson made the preposterous claim that it was their best performance under him. The pressure for regime change in the dugout can be traced to that day.

Five years later, Rodgers went to Goodison Park under pressure and returned to Melwood to be relieved of his job. In a sense, FSG were transported back to square one. They knew the populist gesture was to fire the manager and appoint a cult hero – Dalglish then, Klopp now – and pulled the trigger rather quicker now. Klopp’s arrival has given FSG a credibility they were losing, but, five years on, they are still looking to under-promise and over-deliver on the field.